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Abstract—In this paper, we give a general framework of agent-
based simulation for analyzing behavior of players in various
types of games. In our simulation model, artificial adaptive
agents have a mechanism of decision making and learning
based on neural networks and genetic algorithms. The synap-
tic weights and thresholds characterizing the neural network
of an artificial agent are revised in order that the artificial
agent obtains larger payoffs through a genetic algorithm. The
proposed framework is illustrated with two examples, and,
by giving some simulation result, we demonstrate availabil-
ity of the simulation analysis by the proposed framework of
agent-based simulation, from which a wide variety of simula-
tion settings can be easily implemented and detailed data and
statistics are obtained.
Keywords—artificial adaptive agents, simulation, games, behav-
ior of players.
1. Introduction
In games with multiple equilibria, it is difficult to predict
which equilibrium will be realized because of uncertainty
about actions of opponents. Even in games with a unique
equilibrium, it is known that in some special games, the
prediction of the Nash equilibrium does not always cor-
respond to reality. To examine human behavior in such
games, numerous experiments have been accumulated.
Especially, a considerable number of studies have been
made on experiments for examining human behavior in
coordination games, generalized matching pennies games,
ultimatum bargaining games, market entry games and so
forth [3, 9, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22]. Although in experi-
mental studies, situations in accordance with game models
are formed in laboratories and human subjects are moti-
vated by money, for such experimental environments with
human subjects there exist limitations with respect to the
number of trials, the number of subjects, variations of pa-
rameter settings and so forth.
In most of mathematical models in economics and game
theory, it is assumed that players are rational and maxi-
mize their payoffs, and they can discriminate between two
payoffs with a minute difference. Such optimization ap-
proaches are not always appropriate for analyzing human
behavior and social phenomena, and models based on adap-
tive behavior can be alternatives to such optimization mod-
els. Recently as complements of conventional mathematical
models, a large number of adaptive behavioral models have
been proposed [1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 13, 17, 18, 21, 23].
It is natural that actions of artificial agents in simulation
systems are described by using adaptive behavioral rules,
and simulation can be a promising approach to modeling
situations where it is difficult to assume hyperrational be-
havior of decision makers. We suppose that simulation is
a complement to experiments with human subjects because
an extensive range of treatments can be easily performed by
varying values of the parameters characterizing games in
simulation systems while there exist the above mentioned
limitations in experiments with human subjects. As con-
cerns such approaches based on adaptive behavioral mod-
els, Holland and Miller [12] interpret most of economic
systems as complex adaptive systems, and point out that
simulation using artificial societies with adaptive agents is
effective for analysis of such economic systems. Axelrod [2]
insists on the need for simulation analysis in social sciences,
and states that purposes of the simulation analysis include
prediction, performance, training, entertainment, education,
proof and discovery.
In this paper, we give a general framework of agent-based
simulation for analyzing behavior of players in various
types of games. In our simulation model, the decision
mechanism of an artificial agent is based on a neural net-
work with several inputs, and the agent chooses a strat-
egy in accordance with the output of the neural network.
The synaptic weights and thresholds characterizing the neu-
ral network are revised so that an artificial agent obtains
larger payoffs through a genetic algorithm, and then this
learning mechanism develops artificial agents with better
performance. In Section 2, we describe the agent-based
simulation system with decision and learning mechanisms
based on neural networks and genetic algorithms. In Sec-
tion 3, we provide some simulation result of the coordi-
nation games to demonstrate availability of the simulation
analysis. Finally in Section 4, to conclude this paper, we
make some remarks.
2. Simulation model
In this section, a general framework of agent-based simu-
lation is presented together with two applications to spe-
cific games: the minimum strategy coordination game and
the generalized matching pennies game [14, 15]. An artifi-
cial adaptive agent in our simulation system has a mecha-
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nism of decision making and learning based on neural
networks (see, e.g., Hassoun [11]) and genetic algorithms
(see, e.g., Goldberg [10]).
2.1. Decision making by a neural network
Artificial agents repeatedly play a game; agents obtaining
larger payoff are likely to be reproduced in the next pe-
riod, and conversely agents obtaining only a little payoff
are likely to be weeded out. In our model of an artifi-
cial genetic system embedded in the agent-based simula-
tion model, the whole population is divided into m game
groups, and in each game group the game is played by
n agents. The number of agents, n, depends on setting
of a game.
An artificial agent corresponds to a neural network, which
is characterized by synaptic weights between two nodes in
the neural network and thresholds which are parameters in
the output function of nodes. In our simulation model, an
action of an artificial agent is determined by a vector of
outputs from a nonlinear function with several input data
that the agent can know after playing a stage game. This
decision mechanism is implemented by a neural network.
The synaptic weights and thresholds characterizing the neu-
ral network are revised so that the artificial agent obtains
larger payoffs through a genetic algorithm, and then this
learning mechanism develops artificial agents with better
performance.
Because a structure of neural networks is determined by
the number of layers and the number of nodes in each
layer, an artificial agent is prescribed by the fixed number of
parameters if the numbers of layers and nodes are fixed. In
our model, we form a string compound of these parameters
which is identified with an artificial agent, and the string
is treated as a chromosome in an artificial genetic system
embedded in the simulation model.
2.2. Evolutionary learning through a genetic
algorithm
In a simulation system, the game is played by n artifi-
cial agents in each of m game groups. Therefore, there
are m agents for each type of players. There are s alterna-
tive strategies, and each of the agents chooses one among
them. Mixed strategies can be implemented by some simple
devises if necessary. The payoffs of artificial agents are de-
termined by outcomes of the game. Repeatedly playing the
game, agents obtaining larger payoffs are likely to survive;
if this is not the case, such agents are culled out in time.
In our simulation model, genetic algorithms are employed
as an evolutionary learning mechanism. Because a fitness
in the artificial genetic system is calculated by the obtained
payoffs, agents obtaining larger payoffs are likely to sur-
vive. The general structure of simulation model is shown
in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Flow of the simulation.
The procedure of the simulation is summarized as follows.
Step 1: Generating the initial population. Let the num-
ber of players in the game and the number of
groups for playing the game be n and m, respec-
tively. Then, the whole population of mn artificial
agents is initialized by assigning random numbers
in the interval [−1,1] to the parameters of the
synaptic weights and the thresholds characteriz-
ing the neural network.
Step 2: Forming groups for playing the game. The
whole population with mn agents is divided into
m groups for playing the game.
Step 3: Playing the game. Each agent chooses a strat-
egy in accordance with the output of the neural
network, and the game is played in each of the
groups. The strategy of each agent is determined
by the output of the neural network; an agent se-
lects the strategy corresponding to the node with
the largest output in the neural network. If the
number of generations in the genetic algorithm
reaches the final period of the simulation, the pro-
cedure stops.
Step 4: Performing genetic operations. The ith subpop-
ulation is formed by gathering the ith players
(agents) from the m groups; there are n sub-
populations. The genetic operations are sepa-
rately executed to each subpopulation consisting
of m agents.
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Step 4-1: Reproduction. Let pii denote a payoff of
agent i in the present period. The fitness of
agent i is calculated as a function of pii. As
a reproduction operator, a certain method
such as the roulette wheel selection is
adopted. If the roulette wheel selection, by
a roulette wheel with slots sized by the prob-
ability pselectioni = fi/∑mni=1 fi, each chromo-
some is selected into the next generation.
Step 4-2: Crossover. A certain crossover method such
as the single-point crossover operator is ap-
plied to any pair of chromosomes with the
probability of crossover pc. If the single-point
crossover operator is employed, a point of
crossover on the chromosomes is randomly
selected and then two new chromosomes are
created by swapping subchromosomes which
are the right side parts of the selected point
of crossover on the original chromosomes.
A new population is formed by exchanging
the population in which the crossover oper-
ation is executed for the present generation
with a given probability G. The probabil-
ity G is called the generation gap. An agent
keeps the history of obtaining payoffs in the
past games, and the payoffs are divided be-
tween two offsprings in the proportion of
sizes of the swapped subchromosomes.
Step 4-3: Mutation. With a given small probability
of mutation pm, each gene which represents
a synaptic weight or a threshold in a chromo-
some is randomly changed. The selected gene
is replaced by a random number in [−1,1].
2.3. Applications
So far, we have given the general framework of agent-
based simulation for analyzing behavior of players in vari-
ety types of games. In this subsection, the proposed frame-
work is illustrated with two examples: the minimum strat-
egy coordination game and the generalized matching pen-
nies game [14, 15].
Minimum strategy coordination game. Based on the pro-
posed framework, agent-based simulation systems can be
developed for a wide variety of games, and we can per-
form an extensive range of treatments of the corresponding
simulation by using the system. For instance, we develop
an agent-based simulation system [14] for analyzing the
coordination game treated in the experimental investigation
by Van Huyck et al. [22]. Because this coordination game
is characterized by the minimum values of the strategies
selected by players, we refer to it as the minimum strategy
coordination game.
Before describing the specific structure of the neural net-
work for artificial agents, we give the outline of the min-
imum strategy coordination game. Let the set of players
be N = {1, . . . ,n}. All the players have the common set of
strategies: S = {1, . . . , s¯}. Let xi ∈ S denote a strategy of
player i. Then, the payoff function of player i is represented
by
pi(xi,xi) = amin(xi,xi)−bxi + c,
xi = min(x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xn), a > b > 0, c > 0.
(1)
The payoff of player i decreases with a strategy xi of self,
and increases with the minimum xi among strategies of
the others. To guarantee positive payoffs, the constant c is
added.
An artificial agent as a player in the minimum strategy
coordination game can be implemented by a neural network
which is characterized by synaptic weights and thresholds.
The structure of the neural network is depicted in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. The structure of the neural network for the minimum
strategy coordination game.
There are six inputs in the neural network. In the follow-
ing information of the inputs, the subscript i, i = 1, . . . ,n
means player i and the subscript j, j = 1, . . . ,m means
game group j. Thus, the subscript i j identifies a par-
ticular agent in the agent-based simulation system. For
inputs 1 and 2, because human subjects in the experiment
are informed of the minimum strategy at the last game, and
it is supposed that they remember the strategies selected by
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themselves, the strategy xi j of agent i j and the minimum
strategy y j in game group j are given as inputs of the neural
network; the payoff pii j obtained by agent i j at the last pe-
riod is also given as input 3. Supposing that a player does
not remember an exact history of strategies in the past pe-
riods, but the player remembers at least the most frequent
strategy in the past periods, we provide the weighted most
frequent strategy xTi j in the last T periods as input 4 to the
neural network. In the definition of xTi j, assuming that old
memory is apt to decay, the discount factor w, 0 < w < 1
is introduced. Similarly, as inputs 5 and 6, the weighted
most frequent minimum strategy yTj and the weighted
sum of obtained payoffs in the last T periods are also
given.
An algorithm for evolutionary learning through the genetic
algorithm is modified if necessary. In the experiment con-
ducted by Van Huyck et al. [22], subjects understand the
payoff table defined by the payoff function (1), and it is
not true that they start to play the game without any prior
knowledge of the game. Therefore it is natural for arti-
ficial agents in our system to have some knowledge of
the game before playing it. To do so, by using the er-
ror back propagation algorithm (see, e.g., Hassoun [11])
with the teacher signals, the parameters of the synap-
tic weights and the thresholds in the neural network are
adjusted ahead.
Generalized matching pennies game. We provide another
application of the proposed framework of agent-based sim-
ulation to the generalized matching pennies game treated in
the experiment by Ochs [16]. The payoff table of the gen-
eralized matching pennies game is shown in Table 1. In
this game, the row player has the two choices U and D and
the column player also has the two choices L and R. When
an outcome is (U,L) or (D,R), the row player receives a
positive payoff of a or 1, respectively. When an outcome
is (U,R) or (D,L), the column player receives a positive
payoff of 1. For the payoff a of the row player with respect
to the outcome (U,L), we assume that a≥ 1. When a = 1,
the game is symmetric, and when a > 1, it is asymmetric.
It is known that, in the generalized matching pennies game,
there does not exist any Nash equilibrium with pure strate-
gies but there exists only a unique Nash equilibrium with
strict mixed strategies.
Table 1
A generalized matching pennies game
Row player
Column player
L R
U (a,0) (0,1)
D (0,1) (1,0)
Let p denote a probability of choosing strategy U for
the row player, and let q denote a probability of choos-
ing strategy L for the column player. Then, expected
payoffs piR and piC of the row player and the column player,
respectively, are represented by
piR = apq +(1− p)(1−q), (2)
piC = (1− p)q + p(1−q), (3)
and the corresponding Nash equilibrium is (pNash,qNash) =
(1/2,1/(a + 1)). Because this game is not a zero-sum
game, the maximin strategy is different from the Nash equi-
librium. The maximin strategies of the row player and
the column player are given by argmaxp minq piR(p,q) and
argmaxq minp piC(p,q), respectively, and therefore the pair
of the maximin strategies is (pS,qS) = (1/(a + 1),1/2).
Artificial agents playing the generalized matching pennies
game can be implemented by a neural network in a way
similar to in the previous application of the minimum strat-
egy coordination game. The structure of the neural network
is depicted in Fig. 3.
The inputs of the neural network include not only payoffs
of self obtained in the past periods but also payoffs of an
opponent, and the set of inputs consists of five values. Let
xi( j) be a payoff of player i at period j. Then, the total
payoff of player i at period t is represented by
xtotali (t) =
t
∑
j=1
φ t− ji xi( j). (4)
Fig. 3. The structure of the neural network for the generalized
matching pennies game.
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On the assumption that a decision of the artificial agent is
affected by the payoff obtained before, though the previous
payoff is reduced by (1−φi), the total payoff xtotali is used
as an input 1 of the neural network. In the extended rein-
forcement model by Erev and Roth [7], a similar parameter
is incorporated. In the experiment by Ochs [16], it is found
that there exist some players who take an outcome of the
previous game into account and make a decision. From this
viewpoint, we employ the payoff xlasti obtained at the last
game as input 2 of the neural network. Furthermore, Duffy
and Feltovich [5] claim that choices of players are influ-
enced by the behavior or payoff of the others, and therefore
in our model the payoffs ytotali and y
last
i of an opponent as
well as the payoffs of self are incorporated as inputs 3 and
4 of the neural network. The value of (1− φi) can be in-
terpreted as the rate of forgetting. On our model, the value
of φi as input 4 to the neural network is fixed for each agent
and it is randomly assigned to each agent at the beginning
of the simulation.
The output of the neural network is a probability that the
artificial agent chooses strategy U if the agent is the row
player or strategy L if the agent is the column player.
Because the generalized matching pennies game is a two-
person game, the number of players is n = 2. For devel-
opment of an agent-based simulation system to this game,
we slightly modify the procedure of the simulation to al-
low artificial agents to use mixed strategies. Furthermore,
to examine effect of error in decisions and risk attitude
of players, the fitness of an artificial agent is defined as
a function of the payoff and the parameters of error and
risk attitude in the genetic algorithm embedded in the sim-
ulation system.
Although we have shown only two examples, our general
framework of agent-based simulation can be applicable to
various games and economic situations such as the ultima-
tum bargaining game, the market entry game, and so forth.
3. Analysis of simulation data
In this section, by giving a part of the simulation result of
the minimum strategy coordination game, we demonstrate
availability and effectiveness of the simulation analysis by
the proposed framework of agent-based simulation, from
which a wide variety of simulation settings can be easily
implemented and detailed data and statistics are obtained.
In this example, a variety of treatments are performed by
varying values of some parameters characterizing the game;
the three different simulations are arranged: simulations
coefficients, information, and size.
If the coefficient b of the second term in the payoff func-
tion (1) is positive, it follows that players who select larger
strategies than the minimum strategy pay the penalty. If the
coefficient b is equal to zero, the coordination problem such
as coordination failure and disequilibrium is eliminated. In
the experiment by Van Huyck et al. [22], when b = 0, the
payoff dominant equilibrium is observed; when b = 0.1, the
subjects avoid risky strategies and choices of the subjects
settle into the secure equilibrium. From this result, it is
reasoned that by making the value of b larger from zero,
outcomes of the game shift from the payoff dominant equi-
librium to the secure equilibrium. In simulation coefficient,
two treatments are performed, varying the values of the co-
efficients b and a. Moreover, after putting artificial agents
in experiencing the payoff dominant equilibrium in case of
b = 0, the agents play the games with b 6= 0. By examining
the choices of agents and the realization rate of equilibria
in this simulation, we investigate the relation between the
penalty and the behavior of artificial agents.
In the experiment with human subjects by Van Huyck
et al. [22], two types of treatments of information on out-
comes of the game are performed: one treatment where the
subjects are informed only of the minimum strategy, and
the other treatment where the subjects are informed of the
distribution of strategies selected by all the players. Com-
paring the two treatments, they conclude that informing
the subjects of the distribution of the strategies accelerates
the convergence of behavior of the subjects. In simulation
information, artificial agents are provided three types of in-
formation on outcomes of the game: the minimum strategy,
the minimum and the maximum strategies, and the distri-
bution of strategies. We examine the effect of information
given to artificial agents on the choices of them and the
realization rate of equilibria.
In the experiment, it is also observed that when the num-
ber of players is two, in comparison with the case of 14
or 16 subjects, it is likely to realize the payoff dominant
equilibrium. In simulation size, varying the number of ar-
tificial agents as well as the value of b representing the
degree of the penalty, we investigate influence of the num-
ber of agents on their behavior in the game and outcomes
of the game.
In this paper, as an example, we provide detailed analysis
of only one treatment of simulation coefficients. In gen-
eral as the value of b is made larger and the risk of pay-
ing the penalty increases, the payoff of an artificial agent
selecting a large strategy such as the payoff dominant strat-
egy 7 becomes a small value, and therefore it is likely
to fail in coordination. However, the risk-free game with
b = 0 is not the case. In this treatment, fixing the value of
a at a = 0.2, the value of the penalty coefficient b is var-
ied; it is set at b = 0.0,0.005,0.006, 0.007,0.008,0.009,
0.01,0.02,0.03, 0.04,0.05,0.1. From the data observed in
the treatment, we investigate transitions and steady states
of the choice rate of each strategy, the realization rate of
each individual equilibrium, and so forth.
Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7 show the choice rate of each strat-
egy, the minimum strategy rate of each strategy, the means
of selected strategies and the minimum strategies, and the
normalized average payoff, respectively. For comparison,
in Figs. 4 and 5, the data from the experiment with human
subjects by Van Huyck et al. [22] are provided by outline
symbols. Moreover, the realization rate of each individual
equilibrium and the gross realization rate of equilibria are
given in Figs. 8 and 9, respectively.
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Fig. 4. Choice rate of each strategy in treatment b.
In Fig. 4, the choice rate of each strategy at the steady
state is given. When the penalty is relatively large, i.e.,
b ≥ 0.04, the secure strategy 1 is likely to be selected.
Namely, most of the artificial agents avoid the risk of pay-
ing a large penalty and select the most secure strategy. As
the value of b decreases and therefore the penalty becomes
small, the modal strategy, which is the most frequently se-
lected strategy, grows large from the strategy 1 to the strat-
egy 4 one by one. When b is smaller than around 0.006,
the modal strategy jumps straight to the strategy 7, and
strategies 5 and 6 do not become modal.
Fig. 5. Minimal strategy rate of each strategy in treatment b.
In Fig. 5, the minimum strategy rate of the strategy s means
the rate that the strategy s is the minimum in the game.
From the fact that Fig. 5 is highly similar to Fig. 4, it
follows that the modal strategy in the steady state is almost
the same as the minimum strategy. For the strategy 1, when
b≥ 0.04, although the choice rate of the strategy 1 shown
in Fig. 4 decreases little by little as the value of b becomes
small, the minimum strategy rate of the strategy 1 shown
in Fig. 5 is almost 1.0. Contrary to the strategy 1, when
b = 0, the choice rate of the strategy 7 is almost 1.0, but
the minimum strategy rate falls below 0.9 because the other
strategies are selected on rare occasions.
Compared with the result of the experiment with human
subjects, when b = 0.1, the choice rate of the secure strat-
egy 1 of the artificial agents, 0.99, is larger than that of the
human subjects, 0.72; for the minimum strategy rate, both
of them get the highest rate, 1.0. For the case of b = 0, in
the experiment with human subjects, the value of the gain
coefficient a is set at a = 0.1, which is slightly different
from the setting of the simulation. The choice rate of the
payoff dominant strategy 7 of the artificial agents is 0.99
which is close to the result of the human subjects, 0.956;
the minimum strategy rate of the artificial agents, 0.891, is
larger than that of the human subjects, 0.667. All in all, the
result of the simulation is similar to that of the experiment
with human subjects, and therefore the result of the simu-
lation supports that of the experiment with human subjects.
To be more precise, in the both results, the secure strategy
is dominant when the risk of paying a large penalty is high;
in the absence of such risk, the payoff dominant strategy
is likely to be chosen. From the other perspective on this
similarity, the simulation system successfully emulate the
human behavior in the game.
Fig. 6. Means of selected strategies and the minimal strategies
in treatment b.
In Fig. 6, the means of the chosen strategies and the
minimal strategies are shown; it can be found that these
values are very similar. This fact means that at the steady
state, most of the artificial agents choose the minimal strate-
gies.
From Fig. 7, the payoff obtained by an agent decreases
as the value of b increases from b = 0. At the point of
b = 0.04, the payoff is equal to the payoff of the secure
strategy 1. Because when b ≥ 0.04, the payoff of the se-
cure strategy 1 grows large with the value of b, we can
understand that most of the artificial agents choose strat-
egy 1 in such a situation.
The realization rate of each individual equilibrium is given
in Fig. 8. When b = 0.1, the secure equilibrium (1, . . . ,1)
is realized at the rate of 0.89 in the steady state. Although
as the value of b decreases, the realization rate of the secure
equilibrium decreases, it should be noted that in the inter-
val 0.04 ≤ b ≤ 0.1, only the secure equilibrium (1, . . . ,1)
is realized. As the value of b still decreases over 0.04,
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Fig. 7. Normalized average payoff in treatment b.
Fig. 8. Realization rate of each individual equilibrium in treat-
ment b.
the consecutive equilibria, (2, . . . ,2), (3, . . . ,3), and
(4, . . . ,4), can be found, but the realization rates of these
equilibria do not exceed 0.5. When b ≤ 0.006, the payoff
dominant equilibrium (7, . . . ,7) is realized at the rate larger
than 0.8.
The gross realization rate of equilibria is shown in Fig. 9;
it is found that at both ends of the horizontal axis, b = 0
and b = 0.1, the equilibria are likely to be realized. In the
intermediate cases where effectiveness of the risk of paying
Fig. 9. Gross realization rate of equilibria in treatment b.
the penalty is not clear, it becomes difficult for artificial
agents to coordinate their strategies, and therefore the gross
realization rate of equilibria descends, compared with the
cases of b = 0 and b = 0.1.
As described above we have examined the result of the
treatment on change of the coefficient b, and several char-
acteristics of behavior of agents in the game can be found
through the agent-based simulation based on the proposed
general framework. Although only the two cases of b = 0
and b = 0.1 are performed in the experiment with human
subjects, we conduct various runs of the treatment in the
agent-based simulation and we obtain the following obser-
vations and findings.
1. In the games without the risk of paying any penalty,
the artificial agents successfully coordinate their
strategies and the payoff dominant equilibrium is re-
alized.
2. In the games with the risk of paying a substantial
penalty, coordination among the artificial agents is
failed, but they suitably predict strategies of the op-
ponents and the secure equilibrium forms.
3. The games with the risk of paying the intermediate
penalty are likely to bring outcomes of disequilibria.
4. As the value of b decreases, artificial agents shift
choices of strategies stepwise from the secure strat-
egy 1 to the payoff dominant strategy 7.
5. While the payoff dominant equilibrium is sensitive to
increase of the value of b, the secure equilibrium is
not so sensitive to decrease of the value of b.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have given a general framework of agent-
based simulation for analyzing behavior of players in vari-
ous types of games and economic situations. In our simu-
lation model, the decision mechanism of an artificial agent
is based on a neural network with several input data that
the agent can know after playing a stage game, and the
artificial agent chooses a strategy in accordance with the
output of the neural network. The synaptic weights and
thresholds characterizing the neural network of an artificial
agent are revised so that the artificial agent obtains larger
payoffs through a genetic algorithm, and then this learning
mechanism develops agents with better performance. Fi-
nally, by giving a part of the simulation result of the min-
imum strategy coordination game, we demonstrate avail-
ability and effectiveness of the simulation analysis by the
proposed framework of agent-based simulation.
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